This paper develops a model that captures part of the price discovery process in a multiple dealer market through the quote setting behavior of different market participants. We extend the traditional linear models to a nonlinear VAR with a structural interpretation of the errors. Dealer efficiency is discussed in terms of impulse response functions. In our empirical part we consider the top two ECNs (Island and Instinet) and the top three market makers of 20 highly traded stocks at Nasdaq. Our results include that the sources of nonlinearity are highly significant and indicate a symmetric quote adjustment of dealers to Island quotes. We further find an asymmetric adjustment of quotes to the size of the inside spread.
Introduction
This study examines the dynamics of quote updates by Nasdaq dealers. We propose a nonlinear adjustment model to capture these dynamics. In that respect our model is a generalization of the linear model used so far (see e.g. Hasbrouck (1995) and Huang (2002) ). We discuss price discovery in terms of dealer quoting behavior and as opposed to using information shares we focus on impulse response functions. In our empirical analysis we consider the top two ECNs (Island and Instinet) and the top three market makers of 20 highly traded stocks at Nasdaq. Our results include that the sources of nonlinearity are highly significant and indicate a symmetric quote adjustment of dealers to Island quotes.
The impulse response analysis allows us to draw conclusions on dealer efficiency.
Since the studies by and Christie, Harris, and Schultz (1994) there has been a fierce discussion about competition at Nasdaq. Since 1997, the Order Handling Rule (OHR), stating that all trades have to be executed against the National Best Bid or Offer (NBBO), tick size reduction and the further liberalization of ECNs (Electronic Communication Networks), have brought a great change to this competitive nature of trade at Nasdaq. Nowadays over 60% of quotes are issued by ECNs, which are also considered to be most efficient in terms of quote setting (see e.g. Huang (2002) ).
Efficient ECN quotes would prohibit potential collusion at Nasdaq, since ECNs would only suffer from keeping prices above the level of marginal costs. Since ECN quotes are at the inside most of the times, dealer quotes will become more indicative. Dealer quotes would then be a means of disseminating information through the market. We include ECNs and dealers to discuss quoting efficiency.
Since market makers on Nasdaq compete for order flow there will be competition to set the best quote in the market. Since all trades have to be executed at the inside quote, there will be no gain for dealers to decrease their spreads even further. For this reason we propose a nonlinear model, that has an error correction towards the inside quote, instead of the midpoint (see e.g. Hasbrouck (1991) ). This is one of the nonlinear components in our model.
Given the asymmetric information among dealers, the quoting behavior will be informative to the other dealers in the market. If a dealer has private information and wishes to trade on this, he will set his respective quote at the inside. We therefore argue that being at the inside will reveal the private information and other dealers might respond to this. This is the second nonlinear component in the model. Since ECNs are used by many traders/dealers that wish to remain anonymous when trading, these systems could be the biggest source of information in a stock.
When considering price discovery we do not focus on information shares. The problem with information shares, as mentioned in Hasbrouck (1995) , is that no unique values can be found when quotes are correlated. The traditional approach is to use a Choleski decomposition to establish upper and lower bounds. We propose a specific decomposition, determining a dealer specific component and a market wide component. Thus information is decomposed into a public part and a private part.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we will give a theoretical derivation to justify our model. Section 3 will discuss the empirical models to be tested and will also reflect on the properties of this model. In section 4 we discuss the data set used. Section 5 presents the empirical results of our models. Finally section 6 concludes.
Price Discovery Processes in Multiple Dealer Markets
For an actively traded stock we consider bid and ask quotes from the N most active dealers in terms of quoting frequency. For each dealer let bid i,t ≡ log(Bid i,t ), where Bid i,t is the bid quote for dealer i at time t. Likewise define ask i,t ≡ log(Ask i,t ). These quotes are stacked in the vectors bid t ≡ (bid 1,t , bid 2,t , . . . , bid N,t ) and ask t ≡ (ask 1,t , ask 2,t , . . . , ask N,t ) .
We further define the inside quotes biq t as the highest bid over all dealers and aiq t as the lowest ask over all dealers. We propose a nonlinear vector error correction model for the dynamic interaction in dealer quotes. 
where Φ captures the AR(1) component, Ψ contains coefficients on the nonlinear error correction component and θ considers the exposure to the inside spread.
is a deterministic function of constants and dummies, but is not considered for the moment.
The model implicates that dealer quotes revert to the inside quote and not to the mid quote as in Hasbrouck (1991) , Hasbrouck (1995) and Huang (2002) . Since we consider all dealers to determine the inside quote, this term enters the model exogenously in the estimation. When simulating the model, the inside quotes are determined endogenously.
This is one source of nonlinearity.
In order to see (1) as a generalization of the linear model let us partition Ψ and θ as
Model (1) reduces to a linear VAR if
where ι is a (N × 1) vector of ones. This results in the 4N parameter restrictions
In the restricted model we have that the rows of the Ψ matrix should add up to zero, which imposes linear cointegration upon the model. With these restrictions the inside quotes disappear from the model. A Wald test, considering a χ 2 with 4N degrees of freedom, can be used to test the linear model against the nonlinear one.
In addition to the inclusion of inside quotes we extend the model with inside dummies in the deterministic function D t (·). These dummies are switched on when a dealer reaches the inside quote. This is motivated by the reasoning of Stoll (1989) who argues that there is an effect of a dealer moving away from the inside on the quotes of other dealers. These dummies are a second source of nonlinearity in the dynamics.
We not only expect different behavior in the first moments but also for the second moments. Therefore let us define
We perform a Breusch-Pagan test on the following regression, to test for regime dependent heteroskedasticity.
Given that Ω t has dimensions (2N × 2N ), vech(Ω t ), λ 0 and ζ t are of dimensions ((2N 2 + N ) × 1). Λ 1 is a ((2N 2 + N ) × k) matrix of coefficients and D I t is a (k × 1) variable of dummies which are one when the quote is at the inside and zero otherwise. As opposed to using information shares to determine the price discovery in a market, we take a different approach by looking at impulse response functions, resulting from dealer specific shocks or market wide shocks. For impulse responses in the nonlinear model we follow the approach as in Koop, Pesaran, and Potter (1996) , who consider Generalized Impulse
Response Functions. For a specific history (y t−1 = (ask t−1 , bid t−1 )) and a specific shock (v t ) the Generalized Impulse Response Function (GI) is defined as:
where n is the number of periods considered. For a linear model this definition reduces to standard linear impulse responses. For the nonlinear model these impulse responses are less obvious. The size of the shock and the initial condition influence the result of the function.
Hence we start by providing a definition of an informational shock and determine the size of it. This decomposition also provides the correlations between private shocks, which are used in both the linear and the nonlinear impulse responses. We split the innovation terms η t and ν t into two components,
where ε t represents the market or fundamental noise and ξ bid,t and ξ ask,t represent the dealers' idiosyncratic noise. We impose the following structure on the covariance matrix:
where the (N × N ) matrices Ξ aa , Ξ bb and Ξ ba are all diagonal. All other moments are set equal to zero. Given these assumption on the error term, the unconditional restricted covariance matrix will have the structure:
This decomposition provides us with plausible sizes of dealer specific shocks.
2 Given that the model is nonlinear we have to determine a baseline of the impulse response function 2 Our main interest goes to these dealer specific shock as they indicate the how other dealer react to private information conditional on the initial situation. To construct a baseline we integrate out all possible paths and determine the expected baseline E[y t+n |y t−1 ]. To obtain this baseline one could use a bootstrap to simulate the model. However this approach does not work for model
(1), since we have to maintain positive spreads at all times. Hence we simulate the system (n + 1) steps ahead by conditionally bootstrapping error terms from our estimated model.
We call the bootstrap conditional since we draw from the error term distribution in such a way that we will not encounter any negative spreads. 3 A second reason for doing a conditional bootstrap is the regime dependent heteroscedasticity in the error terms, the distribution of the error term could be different depending on whether dealer i would be at the inside or not.
A number of complications arise when applying this bootstrap. First since the model is simulated inside quotes do not enter the model exogenously anymore. These are now determined endogenously from the simulated quotes of the N included dealers. Second, since the quotes are issued at a discrete price grid we define a dealer to be at the inside if her quote is within the range of half a tick size from the inside. This is done to compensate for the fact that in reality multiple dealers can be at the inside, whereas in our model where prices can take on any value there can only be one dealer at the inside at every time.
Thus we compensate for this by imposing an artificial pricing grid.
When the baseline has been set conditional on the initial situation we can apply a one standard deviation shock with the size determined by our covariance matrix decomposition.
The system is simulated again with the conditional bootstrap mentioned and the final IR function is calculated by subtracting the baseline from the shocked system.
3 Data
Nasdaq data is obtained from the Nastraq data set provided by Nasdaq. This data set includes all transactions, dealer quotes and inside quotes issued at the Nasdaq trading 3 To perform this conditional bootstrap correctly we would have to draw from the error term of our model conditional on the state the model is in. Or to put it differently, if dealer i is at the inside, we have to find an error term where this dealer i is at the inside as well. However, since we are modelling the behavior of 5 dealers, we would have 10! possible distributions to draw from. Since this number much larger than the number of observations that we have, this is empirically not feasible.
system. Since this paper focuses at explaining dealer behavior we only consider the quote data in this paper. One of the great advantages of this data set is that it provides time stamped quotes (to the nearest second) together with the identity of the market maker.
Huang (2002) We remove all days where a dealer posts less than 30 quotes. Next we correct for stock splits by multiplying the data previous to the stock split with the ratio of the stock split, and include a dummy later on in our model for the stock split that has taken place.
Finally, we compare all the dealer quotes with the inside quote and substitute all quotes that deviate more than $ 5 from the inside quote. 4 We make this correction since a dealer always has to trade at the quotes he issued. Whenever a dealer does not want to trade, she will set her quote far away from the inside to prevent this quote from being hit. Since a non-willingness to trade does not add to the price discovery process, we do not want to take these quotes into our model. For zero quotes we follow the same adjustment procedure.
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In over market share from Nasdaq, they still mainly focus on specific stocks traded at Nasdaq.
Another interesting result is that, although the ECNs are in general most efficient with their quotes, there is still a big difference between their spreads and the inside spread. This is confirmed for the stocks of Amgen and Intel in figure 1 , where we see that ECN spreads are still quite large relative to the spread for the inside. The two stocks are selected because we want to see whether there is a difference in the behavior of dealers when market makers are more "efficient" vs ECN that are more "efficient".
Since we excluded the first 20 minutes of the day, we see that the intradaily pattern is quite stable and that we do not observe a strong U-shaped pattern over the day. This is in line with the findings of Chan, Christie, and Schultz (1995) who observe that the U-shaped pattern for Nasdaq stocks is much smaller than for NYSE listed stocks. From these graphs we can also infer that the inside quote is very stable over the day. As was also found by Huang (2002) ECNs are at the inside most often and quote smaller spreads, the same results that we infer from tables 1 and 2.
Results

The linear model
As a benchmark for the nonlinear model, we first present the basic results for the linear VECM. Model (1) is estimated imposing the restrictions in (2) and excluding inside dummies. To investigate the quote dynamics we compute impulse responses. We apply a one standard deviation shock to the idiosyncratic part of each dealer in the system, taking correlations between bid and ask quotes into account. These correlations are determined by the decomposition as in (6). Since shocks are standardized to a one standard deviation shock we cannot make any inferences on the absolute level of quote changes, but we do observe the relative change of the quotes due to a unit shock. Thus price discovery can be explained as the impact on quote changes due to a unit shock. These functions are plotted in figure 2 6 for the two specific stocks: Amgen (AMGN) and Intel(INTC). These graphs show how the impact of a unit shock to a dealer affects the quotes of the other dealers. A remarkable result is that these responses are related to the ranking in spreads for dealers.
For the stock of Amgen the market makers have smaller spreads than the ECNs, and we observe that a shock to these dealers has a higher impact on the new level of the quotes than a shock to the ECNs. The opposite holds for Intel. For Amgen the three market makers move the quotes with about the same magnitude (MLCO has a slightly higher impact on the new level). For Intel it is obviously Instinet that has the highest impact on the other dealers' quotes.
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The level of convergence is not the only relevant indicator of price discovery. Of equal importance is the speed at which quotes converge to this level. This rate gives us a good indication of how fast the price discovery is for a stock but also for how quick price discovery is for a specific dealer. If we consider the responses of the dealers to the shocks to Island and Instinet for Intel we see that all quotes have converged to about the same level within 20 minutes (recalling that we sample at a 2-minute interval). This indicates that private information is incorporated in the market within this time frame. Another example for this are the three market makers for Amgen. All seem to have a similar impact on the final level of quotes, however the private information of market maker 2 takes longer to be incorporated than for the other two market makers. Hence this dealer is considered less efficient then the others
The Nonlinear Model
In the last column of table 3 we report the test statistics for the restrictions in (2). 7 In 14 of the 20 cases we can reject the linear model at the 1% level and 16 at the 5% level. When considering the other nonlinear term, the inside dummies, we see that these are all highly significant, with a χ 2 (100) at a 1% level of 136. This provides us with clear evidence that dealer quotes are subject to nonlinear dynamics.
6 These graphs do not show confidence intervals, since the point estimate and the confidence intervals deviate only marginally from each other and only blur the actual picture. 7 These restrictions are tested with a χ 2 (20) for which the 5% and 1% confidence levels are at 31.4 and 37.6 respectively.
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The linear model can easily be rejected, especially when we consider the inside dummies. Table 6 reports the coefficients on the inside spread. There is a clear adjustment present to keep the spreads small as can be seen from the signs of the coefficients. A striking result is obtained here. The coefficients on the changes in bids are highly correlated with the size of the spread, with the exception of market maker 3. This result shows that there is an asymmetric adjustment to the change in the inside spread and as the spread increases bid quotes tend to go up faster than the ask quotes.
Finally table 7 presents the coefficients on the inside dummies. Focussing on the diagonal of this matrix we see an increasing number of significant coefficients when we go down the diagonal. The sign of these coefficients is undetermined for the bid of Island, but negative for the ask. This means that if Island has the inside ask it will lower the ask quote even further. For the other dealers we note that the coefficients for bids are negative and positive for the asks, indicating a movement away from the inside, when at significance. We remain inconclusive in this, but note that for some stocks in the sample this effect has a significant impact on the behavior of dealers.
Before moving into the simulation of the NL impulse response functions we will first turn to the decomposition of the covariance matrix. By imposing the structure we discussed in equation 7, we try to fit the theoretical structure to the structure that we get from the nonlinear error correction model. We use GMM to achieve this, where we use an identity matrix as the weighting matrix. In tables 9 and table 10 Panel A we show the structure of the covariance matrix as we estimated it from the regression and also show the restricted structure of this covariance matrix in Panel B. When considering table 9 we observe that the noise terms for the ECNs are much larger than for the market makers. In table 2 we already observed that these ECNs had the larger spreads. Clearly there is a lot of idiosyncratic noise around the dynamics for these ECNs. Another interesting result is the cross-dynamics observed between ECNs. Although small compared to the variances, they are still twice the size of the fundamental part. A final remark to this table is the correlation between the bid and ask quote for market maker 3. These error components are almost perfectly correlated. Turning to the covariance matrix of Intel in table 10 we observe the same thing market maker 3. However for this stock the market makers tend to have a higher variance than the ECNs. Further the cross-effects between ECNs have disappeared.
We like to point that the fundamental noise in both matrices are of about the same size for both stocks. One can consider this as the same amount of market wide information flowing into the market, however this could also be due to the time aggregation of dealer quotes (see Hasbrouck (1995) . With the exception of market maker 3 all correlations between bid and ask quotes are close to zero. This is in line with Jang (1991) , who finds that in most cases when dealers receive information, they will only adjust their quote on one side of the market.
Although being very informative on the nature of the dealer, the main use of this decomposition is to provide us with parameters that indicate the size of the fundamental news and the idiosyncratic part, individual to every dealer. We need the sizes of these individual parts in order to apply shocks to the nonlinear model.
Non-Linear Impulse-Responses
As for the linear model we turn to impulse response functions to discuss efficiency and price discovery. In section 2 we provided an overview on how these Generalized Impulse
Responses are determined. Given a specific initial situation we will simulate the model using a conditional bootstrap.
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In obtaining results for these GI functions we simulate 5000 times and use a time horizon of 20 steps, which in our model represents 40 minutes. We consider four situations we are interested in. A one standard deviation shock inwards starting at average spreads, a one standard deviation shock inwards starting at the inside, a one standard deviation shock outwards starting at the inside and finally a shock starting at mean spreads reaching the inside after the shock. In the previous section we decomposed the covariance matrix of the two stocks selected. The idiosyncratic dealer component will be used as a plausible shock size that can occur.
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In figures 3 to 5 we show all IR functions for the shock size determined previously these graphs are discussed simultaneously since we find that the initial situation considered are These results show that the nonlinearities added influence the price discovery in the market. These functions also show that not in all cases ECNs are most efficient dealers.
Conclusion
The structure of Nasdaq is ever changing, with the introduction of SuperMontage as Nasdaq's response to the extreme growth of ECNs. This paper tried to capture dynamics of these quoting systems and the traditional market makers as the situation was in 1999.
Although many things have changed, many of the results obtained in this study remain valid. In this section we briefly summarize these results.
In this paper we propose a new model that extended the linear model of Hasbrouck (1995) .
We proposed a nonlinear model where dealer quotes correct towards the inside quote in the market and also react to the situation dealers find themselves in (i.e. being at the inside). We find that especially the inside dummies have a huge effect on the dealer quoting behavior. In fact dealer strictly react to Island being at the inside. When Island has the bid inside dealer tend to raise their quotes, in a symmetric fashion, and vice versa if Island has the ask inside quote other dealers lower their quotes symmetrically.
Next we propose a decomposition for the structure of the covariance matrix. We show that in almost all cases bid and ask quotes are uncorrelated and hence conclude that idiosyncratic information will only be used on one side of the market.
Finally we discuss price discovery in an impulse response framework. We use a conditional bootstrap for the nonlinear impulse responses and observe that the addition of nonlinearities in the model influence the outcome of these functions substantially. We show that the initial situation is not one of the main determinants, but that it is most likely the inside dummies that drive the results of this function. This is seen by the increasing importance of ECNs in the nonlinear framework. with an asterisk had a stock split occurring within our sample period.
Number of days indicates the days without recording errors or other data problems, and thus indicates the days that where used for further analysis.
For the inside quote and dealer quotes we report the average spreads (in absolute terms). Note: This table reports the coefficients of the Φ matrix in the nonlinear model:
The medians of all 20 stocks in the sample are reported. In brackets we report the number of firms for which φ ij is significant at the 1% level in the model. Note: This table reports the coefficients of the Ψ matrix in the nonlinear model:
The medians of all 20 stocks in the sample are reported. In brackets we report the number of firms for which ψ ij is significant at the 1% level in the model. 
In the first column the medians of all 20 stocks in the sample are reported. In the second column we report the number of firms for which this term is significant at the 1% level. 
The inside dummies are included in the deterministic function D I t . The medians of all 20 stocks in the sample are reported. In brackets we report the number of firms for which the coefficient is significant at the 1% level in the model. Note: This table reports the number of regressions for which we found regime dependent heteroskedasticity at the 1% significance level. The test was performed on the following regression:
t is a (k × 1) variable of dummies which are one when the quote is at the inside and zero otherwise. 
where η t and ν t are the innovation terms of the nonlinear model, ε t represents the market noise and ξ bid,t and ξ ask,t represent the dealers' idiosyncratic noise.
To test the fit of the restricted covariance matrix we perform a Hansen test on the overidentifying restrictions, which is a χ 2 with 39 degrees of freedom equal to the number of moments (55) − the number of parameters(16). 
